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

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NATIONAL CRITICISM

In 1858.

BY WILLIAM MURE

OF CALDWELL.

LONDON:

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1858

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NATIONAL CRITICISM

In 1858.

It is now near thirty years since I first ventured to appear before the public as an author. During that period I have been reviewed, not probably less than sixty times, in critical journals of one or other description. I have, on the whole, no great reason to complain of those reviews, yet several of them have been of a very irritating nature; bitter even to malignity, unfair, and uncritical. On no occasion hitherto have I been provoked to reply. It is agreed among sensible writers that, as a general rule, to answer an anonymous article in a Review is an injudicious, partly because it is commonly a superfluous course. If a work possesses any real value, the more intelligent portion of the public interested in the subject, whose opinions can alone be worth much in the matter, will themselves be able to judge between the author and his reviewer. If the author is right, they will not fail to do him justice. If he is wrong, he will not make his case better in their estimation by defending it.

There are however exceptions to all rules; and I have, though with some reluctance, resolved to treat as such an article in the National Review (January, 1858), on the fifth volume of my History of Grecian Literature. The case of that article is in itself, in one respect, an exceptional one. Among the objections that have been taken to my work above mentioned, or to my capacity as its author, during the eight years that have elapsed since the first part of it was published, I have no recollection of having ever been, till now, found seriously

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deficient in the more rudimentary qualifications for the treatment of my subject. The National reviewer has pronounced me incapable "of translating a piece of Greek verse or prose into accurate English;" and has discovered in me an almost puerile ignorance on the most elementary questions of ancient history and geography. Were my censor not so singularly devoid of either learning or critical judgement as I undertake to prove him to be, it might be some satisfaction to reflect, that the utmost result of his efforts to establish my incompetency by examples from my pages, has been to point out one or two instances, either of simple inadvertence, or of intentional license of expression resorted to for what I considered a legitimate object. And even this phantom of proof has only been conjured into existence by ransacking, besides the volume selected as the immediate subject of his review, the whole previous text of my work; while his boasted rectifications of my alleged errors present a series of blunders, scarcely credible on the part of one possessing even that amount of fourth-form scholarship of which he has made so ostentatious a display.

But it may naturally be asked: Why depart from the general rule of forbearance hitherto observed, in a case so clearly belonging to the category of those in which a violation of that rule has above been pronounced superfluous? My first reason — not, I admit, a very philosophical one — is, that I have been irresistibly tempted to expose the ignorance and nugacity of my most self-sufficient reviewer. Another more rational inducement is, that his criticisms, however valueless in themselves, have in several instances suggested illustrations of the points at issue, which I thought might not be altogether devoid of interest to those qualified to appreciate them, and which I may hereafter have occasion to embody in a more substantial and connected form. But there is still another reason. Apart from my alleged ignorance and errors, my censor has brought, and endeavoured by an elaborate exercise of sophistry on his own part to substantiate against me, several false and frivolous charges of disingenuous and sophistical misrepresentation of the statements or opinions of other writers. It could hardly be expected, even were I willing to overlook the rest, that I should allow such imputations to pass unnoticed.

The first example of my inability to translate Greek, is the version of a fragment of Stesichorus, in the third volume (p. 251.) of my work, published in 1850. The lost poem, entitled Geryonis, to which the fragment belonged, treated what I have described as "the not very genial fable of the

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aërial voyage of Hercules in the drinking-cup of the Sun." Subjoined are both original and translation:

> Ἀέλιος δ' Ὑπεριονίδας δέπας ἐσκατέβαινε
> χρύσεον, ὄφρα δι' ὠκεανοῖο περάσας,
> ἀφίκοιθ' ἱερᾶς ποτὶ βένθεα νυκτὸς ἐρεμνᾶς,
> ποτὶ ματέρα κουριδίαν τ' ἄλοχον
> παῖδάς τε φίλους· ὁ δ' ἐς ἄλσος ἔβα
> δάφναισι κατάσκιον,
> ποσσὶ πάϊς Διός.

> Hyperion now his golden car ascends,
> And o'er the trackless wave of Ocean bends
> His radiant course, to where Night's sacred shades
> Heaven's light absorb; there, in his laurel glades,
> His mother, his fond spouse, and children dear,
> His daily toil with their sweet converse cheer.

The accuracy of this version I am the less prepared to vindicate, that it never was intended to be accurate. The very palpable nature of the irregularities which it presents, with my admission in regard to the most palpable of them that it was intentional, might have satisfied, and seems hitherto in fact to have satisfied, every intelligent reader, that my verses were not meant to be a translation in the proper sense, but a paraphrase. My avowed object was to convey, not so much the precise terms of the original, embodying as it does, in vague fragmentary form, a mystically obscure fable, as to reproduce, as nearly as the idiom of the English language and my own ability permitted, the soft harmonious flow of the poet's versification, in his description of the sun's evening course in the heaven. Finding therefore the *cup* of the mystical fable difficult to deal with, I converted it into the *car* of the poetical fable, apologising for the liberty in a note; and in the sequel took a further liberty, in transposing the literal sense of the last part of the fragment, the better to preserve its musical sound and metrical spirit.[1] Had the National reviewer, therefore, simply condemned the version,

[1] It is not very easy to recall the precise circumstances under which one may have written a particular passage some eight years ago. On referring, however, to the subsidiary materials then at my disposal, I observe that modern critics of taste and discernment have conjectured what is now the last line of the fragment to be a spurious addition to the genuine text on its passage to posterity; and hence that, in the original poem, the laurel grove really belonged to the resting-place of the Sun rather than to that of Hercules. It is possible that, in the turn given to my paraphrase, I may have been influenced by this suggestion. I must, however, admit, that I should not have acted on it in a literal translation of the passage. Conf. Schweigh. ad Athen. xi. p. 469.

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on the ground that no free paraphrase was allowable in such a case, or that my paraphrase was too licentious, I could hardly have objected to his line of censure. But the extraordinary pains which he has taken to prove that to be incorrect, which no reasonable being could ever suppose was meant to be accurate, is a sample, at the outset, of the sort of critical acumen that seasons his whole article.

Of the success of his commentaries, when they extend beyond the province of truism, we have a fine specimen in the subjoined remark (p. 72.) on the first words of my version:

"Αέλιος Ὑπεριονίδας is no more to be translated Hyperion, than Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος is to be translated Peleus."

My first sensation, on being initiated into this profound canon of Homeric criticism, — for, as will be seen, it extends to a whole class of cases, — was one of mingled amazement and amusement, at the self-complacency with which my censor has here perpetrated a blunder, for the perpetration of which, if capable of it, an Eton or Westminster upper-school boy would deserve to be flogged. My next feeling was one of shame, that a respectable English Quarterly should, in a department of criticism in which England was once preeminent, possess a contributor so singularly incompetent for his office. Had the National reviewer ever happened to read a little more of the Iliad than the first line, of which he has here quoted the last two words, he would have known that Hyperionides and Hyperion, with Homer and his school of poetry, of which Stesichorus was one of the most zealous disciples, are, as figurative patronymics of the Sun-god, strictly synonymous terms. He would have known that they stand precisely in the same joint relation to that deity as Cronides and Cronion to Jupiter, Atrides and Atrion to Agamemnon, Pelides and Pelion to Achilles. The better to enlighten his ignorance, I subjoin two parallel passages:

Il. VIII. 480. ἦμενοι, οὔτ' αὐγῆς Ὑπερίονος Ἠελίοιο . . .
Od. XII. 176. Ἠελίου τ' αὐγὴ Ὑπεριονίδαο ἄνακτος.

My translation, therefore, of Helius Hyperionides by Hyperion, tallies exactly with Pope's translation of Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρείδαο by Atrides, and of Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος by Pelides; and much as may be said of the general license of our English poet's version of Homer, I never heard of his having been found fault with for the scores of times in which he, in common with other far more exact translators, has so expressed himself. But this

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is not all. Homer himself familiarly uses Hyperion precisely as I have used it, in its single capacity, for the Sun-god, as the exact equivalent consequently of Helius Hyperionides; just as he uses Atrion singly for Agamemnon, Cronion for Jupiter, and Pelion for Achilles. I again quote chapter and verse for my learned reviewer's benefit:

Il. XIX. 398. τεύχεσι παμφαίνων, ὥστ' ἠλέκτωρ Ὑπερίων.
Od. I. 24. οἱ μὲν δυσομένου Ὑπερίονος, οἱ δ' ἀνιόντος. . . .

Hyperion is also the Sun-god in the Delian hymn (369.); with the Orphic poets (Argon. 1222. alibi); with Ovid (Met. viii. 564.; Fast. i. 383.), and doubtless other epic writers, of whose works individual passages do not here occur to me. It now appears however, that Homer, and the Hymnographers, and Orpheus, and Ovid, and Pope, and their humble follower the author of these remarks, have been all along in the wrong. The National critic has found us out at last, and pronounced that Hyperion can no more be considered as equivalent to Helius, or, by consequence, Atrion to Agamemnon, or Cronion to Zeus, than Pelides is equivalent to Peleus. How much it is to be regretted that this profound Hellenist had not flourished in the days of Homer, and been charged with the revisal of his works before publication; what a number of blemishes would he have been the means of correcting in the text of that blundering old poet.

I have above described Hyperion and Hyperionides as figurative patronymics; and they appear in Homer's usage to have been purely figurative; titles significant of attributes rather than genealogical epithets. Homer knew no Titan Hyperion, who first appears as father of the Sun-god in Hesiod's Theogony. The two patronymic titles are obviously expressive of the God's lofty course in the heavens, and might hence be rendered "Son of height," or "loftiness;" by the same analogy as, in the subsequent literary mythology, Mimnermus is styled Ligystiades, or Son of complaint, in allusion to the plaintive tone of his poetry.[1]

I must now be permitted for a moment to turn the tables on my censor, by charging him with an offence, commonly con-

[1] The derivation of a patronymic Hyperion from a proper name Hyperion, cannot be reconciled with any received principle of analogy. The mode suggested by the lower grammarians, of a contraction from Ὑπεριονίων, is absurd. If Homer had any such etymology in view, it was probably from the primitive root, Ὑπερος, *Superus*; whence Ὑπερίων, Ὑπεριονίδης, by the same analogy as Ἰαπετὸς, Ἰαπετίων, Ἰαπετιονίδης. (Hesiod, Theog. 528.) The short ι of the penultimate syllable would, by the common usage of epic prosody, as one of three concurring short syllables, become long.

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sidered even graver than that of careless translation,—that of having materially falsified my text in quoting my version of the text of Stesichorus. The first line of that version has above been cited by me as it stands in the third volume of my work. By the National critic it has been altered in the mode here subjoined:

"Hyperion now his *lofty* car ascends."

It is not possible that so zealous a champion of accurate citation could himself be guilty of a mistake, when in the very act of strenuously enforcing his rules against others. I must therefore assume that he considers "lofty" to be the true English meaning of *χρύσεος*, and has good-naturedly substituted his own correct for my false rendering, without thinking it necessary to rebuke my error, his case being in other respects so strong against me. I had thought that *χρύσεος* meant golden; but I bow to his superior scholarship, and acquiesce in the correction. He also objects, as already stated, to my substitution of car for cup, and to the word "ascends" at the close of the verse, pronouncing the English equivalent for *ἐσκατέβαινε*, to be "went down into." With these amendments the poet's beautiful line assumes the following elegant form:

But Helius Hyperionides went down into his lofty cup.

It is to be regretted that the National critic has not explained: I. in what sense the cup is here styled "lofty;" II. how Helius performed the operation of "going down into it." The entire Stesichorean fragment, obscure as it is in other respects, represents, there can be little doubt, the moment at which Helius, having accommodated Hercules with an aërial drive in his cup for the prosecution of certain necessary business, redeposits the hero on some convenient spot of *terra firma*. Assuming him to have halted in the upper air for this purpose, to have sprung down from his cup to the lower region in company with Hercules, and then to have sprung back into it from below, the expression "lofty" would be appropriate, as describing the position of the cup. But it does not appear with what propriety, in this case, Helius can be said to have "gone down into it," on resuming his own journey. If, on the other hand, he drove from the zenith to the earth, and after having attended his guest out of the cup, "went down into it" again by himself, it does not appear how the cup could properly be styled lofty. It is to be hoped the National critic will clear up these obscure points in his next essay on the subject.

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I cannot however, even on etymological grounds, allow to pass unquestioned his pedantic preference of "went down into," to the classical English phrase "ascend," or "mount," as a poetical equivalent of *ἐσκαταβαίνω*, or of any other Greek word denoting the act of seating oneself in a travelling vehicle. In the first place, it is not possible for either man or god, when on his feet on the ground, to go down into such a vehicle, especially a cup-formed vehicle (unless indeed it happened to be sunk in some pit or hollow place), without first getting up into it. I apprehend therefore, that in the combination *ἐσκαταβαίνω*, the preposition *ἐς*, which my reviewer here translates simply "in" or "into," really rather means "up to" or "up into," as it frequently does with Homer; and that the effect of its combination with the second preposition *κατά*, here is to express the twofold motion of a person seating himself in a carriage; which is first to ascend, and then, according to the degree in which it may be more or less cup-formed, to descend into its interior. The phrase therefore, "go down into," while plainly detestable in point of style, is perhaps even less etymologically correct than either of the terms "ascend" or "mount," which have for ages been authorised by our standard writers, and by inveterate usage, as the truly classical and poetical English expressions for entering a chariot.

Having proved Homer's ignorance of Greek mythology; having falsified my translation of Stesichorus; having himself translated *χρύσεος* by lofty; and having helped Helius to "go down into his lofty cup," the National critic proceeds, with equal tact and accuracy, to detect and rectify my inaccurate translations of Thucydides. I shall take first in order the most tangible of my alleged blunders. In the historian's episode on the Pisistratidæ, I have rendered the passage: *τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν καλῶς διεκόσμησαν*, by "adorned their city beautifully." My censor rejects this interpretation, and asserts (p. 88.) that the passage means, and that "Liddell and Scott support him in hold-" ing that it means, not that they adorned the city beautifully, "but that they ruled the city well." It is quite possible that I may not be right in rendering *διεκόσμησαν* by adorned; and, as will be seen in the sequel, I never felt certain of being so. But of this I am certain, that my reviewer here, as in every other similar case, is wrong. I am not much in the habit of taking my sense of words from school dictionaries. I prefer being guided by parallel texts of the same author, or of authors of the same age; and, in so far as modern authorities are concerned, by the best lexicographers and commentators who have specially devoted themselves to the illustration of each par-

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ticular writer. I have, however, a high respect for Liddell and Scott, and believe their book to be the best of its kind which we possess. I have therefore been gratified to find, on referring to their columns, that my reviewer's assertion is here not in unison with the fact, neither "rule," nor any other equivalent term being (in the edition which I consulted) among their explanations of the verb *διακοσμέω*. But, even had it been so, I should not the less have denied that either *διακοσμέω*, or any other Greek verb so compounded with the preposition *διά*, bears with any writer of the Attic period, or could, consistently with the analogy of the Greek tongue, bear that interpretation.

Κοσμέω, and its derivative *διακοσμέω*, have in common two cognate varieties of signification: 1. to adorn, deck out, beautify; 2. to order, dispose, adjust. With Thucydides the former signification is greatly predominant in the case of *κοσμέω*; the latter in the case of *διακοσμέω*. I had hence in the first instance adopted the latter in the text here in question, but was led by force of evidence to reject it. The passage, as I well remember, caused me some difficulty; the space required for it in my MS. having been for a time left vacant, and finally filled up as it has been, with diffidence. I am unwilling to dwell on such dry details of verbal criticism; but it may not perhaps be altogether uninteresting to the scholar who, in similar cases, is in the habit of doing a little more than consulting and misquoting his school lexicon, to trace the steps by which a fellow-labourer in the same field of research has been led, in a case of some nicety, to a particular conclusion. The whole passage is as follows (vi. 54.):

Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἐπαχθὴς ἦν ἐς τοὺς πολλούς, ἀλλ' ἀνεπιφθόνως κατεστήσατο· καὶ ἐπετήδευσαν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὴ τύραννοι οὗτοι ἀρετὴν καὶ ξύνεσιν· καὶ Ἀθηναίους εἰκοστὴν μόνον πρασσόμενοι τῶν γιγνομένων, τήν τε πόλιν αὐτῶν καλῶς διεκόσμησαν, καὶ τοὺς πολέμους διέφερον, καὶ ἐς τὰ ἱερὰ ἔθυον. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα αὐτὴ ἡ πόλις τοῖς πρὶν κειμένοις νόμοις ἐχρῆτο.

Nor was he (Hipparchus) otherwise oppressive to the people in his government, but established it on no invidious footing; and in truth these tyrants were greatly distinguished for virtue and discretion; and while levying from the Athenians only a twentieth part of their revenue, adorned their city beautifully, and carried on their wars prosperously, and provided for the sacrifices. In other respects, too, the city enjoyed its former laws. . . .

My first reason for altering my original version, "ordered the state well," into "adorned their city beautifully," was, that Thucydides, I observed, had already several times in the course of these few lines ascribed, though in somewhat different terms, to the Pisistratidæ the same merit of "ordering the state well;"

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once at least in the previous part of the passage: *τὴν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἀνεπιφθόνως κατεστήσατο*· and once in the sequel: *ἡ πόλις τοῖς πρὶν κειμένοις νόμοις ἐχρῆτο.* It seemed therefore, that a third statement to a like effect was to be avoided, as forcing on the historian a tautological superfluity inconsistent with his usual compression of style. It is clear, secondly, that the *διακόσμησις*, whatever it may have been, was something involving expense; as well from the immediately preceding sentence: "while only taxing the Athenians at the rate of five per cent," as from the other two examples of official administration jointly adduced in the same context: waging war, and providing for the sacred solemnities; both being, the latter in Athens above all Greek cities, of a costly nature. But the mere "ordering the state well," or, as previously expressed, "establishing his government on no invidious footing," was not a thing requiring special outlay at Athens or elsewhere. For Thucydides therefore to have said that the Pisistratidæ, "while only taxing the Athenians at five per cent, ordered the state well," would have been much as if a eulogist of the Whig ministry of 1831 were to say, that "although they made no addition to the taxes for that year, they introduced a Reform bill." But the decoration of the city with public buildings, gardens, fountains, temples, &c., for which the Pisistratidæ were celebrated, cost them probably more money than either, or perhaps both together, of the other two specified objects of expenditure. A third, more subtle, but which, to those who appreciate the nicer delicacies of Greek style, will appear no less valid argument in favour of the version preferred, is supplied by the phrase "*τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν*," "*their* city;" the city of the Athenians (not of the tyrants); the term *πόλις* being here evidently used, not in the sense of state or polity, but of town or metropolis; the decoration of which was a source of pride and gratification to the citizens, and of popularity to their rulers. Thucydides would hardly, in any such combination, have used the term *πόλις* in the political sense, "*their* state or polity," at the moment when he was treating of the usurpation of that state by the tyrants. These considerations decided me in preferring the version adopted; and I was further confirmed in its favour, by observing that it had been also unanimously preferred by the historian's best-accredited lexicographers and translators, in so far as I have had access to their works.[1]

Whoever has had occasion to render portions of this historian's

[1] "Urbem egregie exornarunt:" Hudson, Stephanus, Duker, Bekker. "Adorned the city:" Hobbes; Blomfield. Conf. Bétant, Lex. Thuc. in voce.

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text into English, or to examine interpretations of it by standard commentators, must have remarked that, owing to the extreme condensation of thought and expression in which he delights, it is often impossible to convey the full sense of a passage by a strict adherence to the letter of the original, or even, at times, without the addition of entire sentences, expletive of ideas which were evidently complete in his mind, but would be wanting in a literal English version. An illustration of this remark is supplied by the passage in which he introduces the same episode on the Pisistratidæ, to which attention has just been directed. After describing the sacrilegious mutilation of the Hermæ, and the severity with which the Athenians proceeded against those suspected of the offence, which (for reasons afterwards assigned) they connected with plots against their liberties, the historian continues:

"For the people, knowing by report that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had been harsh towards its close, and moreover that it had not been abolished by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedæmonians, were ever since [on occasions of this kind] in a state of alarm, and looked with suspicion upon everything."—VI. 53.

I have enclosed in brackets the expletive sentence, which I considered necessary to convey in English the full meaning of the historian's emphatic *ἐφοβεῖτο ἀεὶ καὶ πάντα ὑπόπτως ἐλάμβανε*. It appeared to me that the bare translation: "were ever since in a state of alarm," &c., would not have conveyed his true meaning; because it would have made him state what was palpably false and absurd. The Athenians had not been ever since, or "always," according to the still more precise expression of the original, in a state of alarm and suspicion. They were not so during the more popular period of the government of Pericles. They were not so during the first four years of the war, while he continued to direct their counsels. Nor during his whole previous career of virtually despotic ascendancy, of lavish expenditure at home, and of conquest or usurpation abroad, is there any authentic record of alarm or suspicion as prevalent in Athens, lest his power, wealth, or ambition should, in themselves or their results, prove dangerous to the national liberty. As little trace is there of any such feeling during the ascendancy of his predecessor and rival Cimon; although that statesman's known predilection for aristocratic government, and his opposition to the democratic measures of Pericles, might naturally have caused him to be suspected of unconstitutional tendencies. Hence it is that, with obvious reference to the unblemished purity of that generation of statesmen, Aristophanes, in ridiculing

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Cleon in The Wasps (488.), charges him and his party, among other artifices of low demagogue policy, with having raised the old cuckoo cry of "No Tyranny!—which had not been heard for the last fifty years."

Here however I imagine the reader interposing and asking: What is the use of all this elaborate argument to prove what is so self-evident? Who can believe that Thucydides meant literally to assert anything so preposterous in itself, or so contrary to historical fact, as that the minds of the Athenians, during the century between the expulsion of Hippias and the siege of Syracuse, were in a perpetual state of alarm and suspicion of tyrannical plots and conspiracies; or that he means anything more than that they were subject to alarm and suspicion on occasions when there was some ostensible cause of apprehension, and especially on occasions such as that which led him to introduce his remark? This is no doubt the commonsense view of the case; but it is not the only view. The National critic denounces it as false, and injurious to the historian, and myself as a corrupter of his text, for translating or construing as I have done the portion of it above quoted. He maintains in the most peremptory manner, that "Thucydides, "like Aristophanes, goes much further, and accuses the Athe- "nians, *truly or falsely*," of being in a state of alarm and suspicion, "*ἐφοβεῖτο ἀεὶ καὶ πάντα ὑπόπτως ἐλάμβανε*,—not only on occasions of this kind, but on all occasions." According to him they were in that unhappy state of mind, as well during the whole leadership of Pericles as during that of Alcibiades; as well during the delivery of the Epitaphian address, as during the process against the Hermocopidæ. From his appeal to Aristophanes, he would seem to have read about as much of that poet as of Homer. He could not, as appears from the passage above cited, have summoned a witness more damaging to his cause. That Aristophanes here does not speak at random, may be gathered from the coincidence that the period of fifty years which he specifies, tallies to a year or two with the interval between the representation of The Wasps and the treason of Themistocles, which would naturally connect itself in the popular mind with plots to establish Tyranny. Nor is the satire of Aristophanes here directed against any real alarm of tyranny even in the time of Cleon, but against that demagogue's attempts to excite such alarm. There is no evidence, even assuming the satire to have been merited by Cleon, that his attempts were successful; or that there really existed in the minds of the Athenians, between the death of Pericles and the mutilation of the Hermæ, any more pervading apprehension of

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tyranny than had existed under the government of Pericles.[1] The National critic has also appealed to Grote as an authority for his view. I have carefully examined the text both of that historian and of Thirlwall, and both appear to be clearly against him. The only causes or occasions of such popular alarm noticed by either, during the period here in question, are: the case of the Hermocopidæ, and the previous profanation of the Mysteries by Alcibiades. To these examples might be added the accusation of "Medism," mixed up, according to some authorities, with that of impiety, in the sentence against Anaxagoras; all of which cases range themselves, more or less, under the definition of "occasions of this kind," in my explanatory supplement to the historian's text.

My reviewer's further insinuation, that I have disingenuously inserted that definition into the passage, the better to make out a case of inconsistency against Thucydides, in my subsequent remarks on his Pisistratian episode, bears its nugacity on its own face. The case of inconsistency would be equally valid without the expletive sentence: while any purpose on my part to disparage the historian, would have been far more effectually served, by giving him credit for the statements or opinions which I have rejected as unworthy of his common sense and historical judgement.

The next of my alleged inaccuracies of matter and style has been rebuked by the National critic in the following terms (p. 89.):

"Colonel Mure is particularly careless about those little technicalities of the age, which it is everywhere desirable to retain. When a modern writer, dealing with a medieval chronicle, translates Rex Francorum, King of France; or when he talks of an emperor of Germany, or converts the Ῥωμαῖοι of a Byzantine author into Greeks, —he is destroying so many touches which express the diplomacy of the age. Colonel Mure is guilty of nearly the same fault when he translates the Μηδισμός of Thucydides (I. 135.) by 'traitorous intercourse with the Persian king.' Herodotus and Xenophon, both of them oriental antiquaries, correctly call the dominant Asiatic tribe Persians. Thucydides retains the common phrase of the general Greek public, and speaks of the Medes."

The combination of ignorance and presumption in this pompous parade of worse than "medieval" pedantry, is truly

[1] It may be further observed accordingly, that the only allusion by Aristophanes to the popular cry of "No Tyranny," in his dramas of date prior to the mutilation of the Hermæ, is in his ridicule of Cleon in The Wasps. In those of subsequent date such allusions become much more frequent, and probably better founded.

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lamentable. Thucydides not only "calls the dominant Asiatic tribe Persians," but he so calls them in a still more specific manner than does Herodotus; and precisely in such a manner, as not merely to justify my expression Persian king, but to render the form which my censor would substitute, a sin against the historian's idiom. He has here shown, not only his superficial acquaintance with Thucydides, but his blindness to a characteristic peculiarity of that author's usage, which he will now at least enjoy the benefit of having pointed out to him. Such blindness, but for the confident tone in which he boasts of his clearness of vision, would be excusable on the part of a third-rate Hellenist; the peculiarity in question being of so subtle a nature, that it might easily escape any student of the historian, but one who has been obliged to probe to the quick every chapter, sentence, and phrase of his work. It may hence possibly prove a novelty to scholars of superior mark to my reviewer. It is this: that wherever Thucydides speaks of the Medo-Persian people and its affairs in the mass, and in general terms, he invariably uses the term Mede and its derivatives: *οἱ Μῆδοι*; *ὁ Μῆδος* (as a collective singular)[1]; *τὰ Μηδικά*; *ὁ Μηδικὸς πόλεμος*, &c. Wherever on the other hand he speaks specially of the "dominant Asiatic tribe," of the Persian king himself, his court, his nobles, or officers of rank, he as invariably uses the term Persian. The distinction is so systematic, as to prove it to be intentional. The passages of the former class are the most numerous. Those of the latter, as being comparatively few, are here subjoined:

I. 13. *ἐπὶ Κύρου Περσῶν πρώτου βασιλεύοντος . . .*; 14. *Δαρεῖος . . . ὃς μετὰ Καμβύσην Περσῶν ἐβασίλευσε*; 16. *Κῦρος καὶ ἡ Περσικὴ βασιλεία*; 89. *οἱ δυνατοὶ τῶν Περσῶν*; 109. *Μεγάβαζον ἄνδρα Πέρσην* (twice); 137. *μετὰ τῶν κάτω Περσῶν τινός* (the Persian friend who escorted Themistocles to the court of Artaxerxes); IV. 50. *Ἀρταφέρνην ἄνδρα Πέρσην*; VIII. 108. *Ἀρσάκου τοῦ Πέρσου Τισσαφέρνους ὑπάρχου.*[2]

[1] In the same collective sense he uses *ὁ βάρβαρος*, also commonly to denote the Medo-Persians, in many passages; and in VI. 78. *ὁ Συρακόσιος* for the Syracusians, *ὁ Ἀθηναῖος* for the Athenians. This has been called an Attic idiom by the grammarians, as being also observable in Aristophanes, Demosthenes, and other Attic writers. It is, however, equally, or still more frequent, with Herodotus; as well in the forms *ὁ Μῆδος*, *ὁ βάρβαρος*, common to Thucydides, as in *ὁ Πέρσης*, *ὁ Λάκων*, *ὁ Σπαρτιήτης*.

[2] The remaining three passages in which the word Persian occurs are here less immediately in point. The distinction however between the dominant tribe and the Medes is still recognisable. In I. 138. Themistocles, before taking up his abode with Artaxerxes, makes himself master *τῆς Περσίδος γλώσσης*, as the language of the king and court. In I. 104. we have

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Thucydides having, in his previous narrative, fully explained the nature of the Spartan prince's treason, is here content to use the general term "Medism," in his incidental allusion to it. But as it was important, for the full effect of my version of the passage, to specify the real nature of that treason, as being, in the proper sense of the phrase, "a traitorous intercourse with the Persian king," I have so characterised it, in the true spirit of Thucydidean idiom.

The National critic is equally, or still more grossly at fault, in regard to Herodotus; who uses both terms to denote "the dominant Asiatic tribe;" and during the greater part of his work quite promiscuously. But here again may be observed a peculiarity of Herodotean usage, parallel to the Thucydidean peculiarity above noticed, and which it was equally improbable the superficiality of this reviewer should have led him to perceive. In the earlier part of his narrative, Herodotus uses the term Persian exclusively, to denote the Persian power or empire in the more comprehensive sense; limiting the title Mede to the properly Median element of the nation. The reason is obvious. During the period there described the two races, as victor and vanquished, were still in a certain relation of antagonism to each other. The final state of union or consolidation in which they appear during the Græco-Persian wars, was the work of Darius. Prior to the reign of that monarch accordingly, the nation in its integrity is never styled Mede by Herodotus. From the accession of Darius downwards, Mede, in the wider sense, begins to creep in. The first example is towards the end of the third Book, in the account of the expedition sent by that monarch to arrest the fugitive physician Democedes. In the latter part of the work Mede is used promiscuously with Persian; though on the whole less frequently. Yet on some occasions it predominates; in the account, for example, of the battle of Marathon. In further proof of the futility of my reviewer's rule of distinction, Xerxes, in Herodotus, is occasionally styled "King of the Medes" (VIII. 114., IX. 7.), a phrase altogether repugnant to Thucydidean usage.

Here again we have a friendly ray of light on the National critic's study of Herodotus; showing it to have been about as profound as that of Homer, Aristophanes, and Thucydides. He has, it seems, looked a little into the first book or two of the Father of history; and finding the title Persian to be there

Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων, to designate separate portions of a Perso-Median army; and in I. 130. Pausanias, when affecting Perso-Median manners, provides himself with σκευὰς Μηδικάς, and a τράπεζαν Περσικήν.

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alone used in the wider sense, he has assumed it to be so used throughout. And this is the gentleman who rebukes others for "carelessness of those little technicalities of the age which it is so desirable to retain!"

"Two chapters on," our National Aristarchus continues, "we find in Thucydides the phrase Μαγνησίᾳ τῇ Ἀσιανῇ. Colonel Mure renders it Magnesia in Asia Minor. . . . This rendering obliterates the accurate geographical precision of the historian. Colonel Mure can hardly need to be told that there are two cities equally answering to his description of Magnesia in Asia Minor, only one of which answers to that of Thucydides, Μαγνησίᾳ τῇ Ἀσιανῇ. Thucydides means Magnesia in Asia, in the very narrowest sense of that last word, the district near Ephesus. Colonel Mure's description would equally suit the more northern city of Magnesia by Sipylos, from which Thucydides wishes to distinguish it."

Unless my reviewer had himself furnished the proof of it, I could hardly have conceived it possible for even the most accomplished blunderer, to have comprised so great a number of blunders in so small a number of words as he has done in the extract above cited. I. It is not true that Thucydides ever uses the word Asia or its derivatives in any other sense than as denoting the whole continent of that name. The gentilic Ἀσιανός, here, as in I. 6., the only other occasion of its occurrence, is used in that more comprehensive sense. II. It is not true that either Thucydides or his fellow-Greeks of the Attic period, knew any province of Asia, "in the very narrowest sense of the word as a district near Ephesus;" or that any such geographical distinction existed during that period, or for many centuries afterwards. III. My learned censor has here committed the enormous anachronism, of transferring the Asia proconsularis of the Byzantine age[1] to the age of Thucydides. IV. It is not true that the other Magnesia, from which, as he imagines, the historian "wishes to distinguish" the Magnesia on the Mæander (the city of Themistocles here in question), is the city of Magnesia by Sipylos. If Thucydides wishes to draw any such distinction, it is between the Magnesia on the Mæander, — the "*Asiatic* Magnesia," as he calls it, — and its supposed metropolitan city or district, the *European* Magnesia of Thessaly, on the opposite side of the Ægæan. There is, however, no necessity for assuming that he had any such distinction in view; definitions of this kind being not uncommon in his

[1] See Smith, Dict. of Geogr. vol. I. p. 239.

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text, in cases where no topographical specification was required; as for example, where he speaks (VIII. 39.), of *Καῦνον τῆς Ἀσίας*, although there was no other city of that name, and describes (I. 137.) the Macedonian port of Pydna as *Πύδναν τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου*, although no other Pydna then existed. V. It is not true, or at least there is no reason to believe, that the Magnesia by Sipylos had been founded in the time of Thucydides; or if so, that it was a place of such importance as to have been noticed by him. Among the proofs that it was not, is this very passage of his work. He would hardly have here used the epithet Asiatic in a distinguishing sense, had he known another city of the same name in a neighbouring district of Asia. There is no allusion to Magnesia by Sipylos in any author prior to the commencement of the Roman empire; when it is chiefly noticed in connexion with the defeat of Antiochus the Great by the two Scipios in its neighbourhood, in 190 B.C. In the Periplus of "Scylax," the earliest probable date of which compilation is the latter part of the fourth century B.C., several generations after the death of Thucydides, the city on the Mæander alone is mentioned.[1]

Lest it might seem that I have here dogmatically condemned any part of this series of blunders on my own *ipse dixit*, I shall relieve myself of a portion at least of that responsibility, by shaping my argument as I have done in the previous case of Hyperion. If my reviewer is right in his commentary on that name, he has convicted not me alone, but Homer, Ovid, Pope, and other standard poets and critics, antient and modern, of gross ignorance of Greek mythology and Greek style. In like manner, if he is right in his interpretation of *Μαγνησία ἡ Ἀσιανή*, he will have convicted the best-accredited classical geographers, antient and modern, from Strabo down to Pauly and Smith, of either gross ignorance or gross stupidity: of ignorance, if they knew not this passage of Thucydides; of stupidity in interpreting it, if known to them, in the more comprehensive sense. Possibly, when the survivors among them become aware that the National critic has discovered at last that the province of Asia, in the "very narrowest sense of the district near Ephesus," which they suppose was first established by Constantine or his successors, already existed in the time of Thucydides, they will be at pains to have their chapters

[1] In Smith's Dict. of Geogr., the citation of this notice of Scylax as referring to the more northern city of the name, is evidently a mistake. The place is described as in the neighbourhood of Ephesus, and as in the extreme south of Lydia, which in the geography of Scylax extended to the Mæander.

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on Asia correctly rewritten for the next edition of their works.[1]

Before correcting, in the ingenious commentaries above examined, my errors of classical geography, the National critic had already, in a concise marginal note (p. 72.), summarily disposed of my pretensions to either historical or political knowledge: "A thoroughly accurate thinker on Greek politics "would hardly, as Colonel Mure constantly does, apply the "words 'confederation,' 'federal,' &c., to the state of things ex- "isting between the several Grecian cities. He would not re- "peatedly speak of the 'council' at Athens, when he means, "not the Senate, but the Public assembly."

It is painful, no doubt, to be so stigmatised by one so "thoroughly accurate" on all points of classical antiquity as I have above shown this reviewer to be. The doctrine however, that no man can think accurately on questions of Greek polity who, when incidentally alluding to the deliberations of the democratic

[1] I agree with my reviewer that the epithet "Minor," attached by me to Asia in the passage above examined, had better have been left out. But he is only half right in his objection. It is true, in the literal sense, that "Asia Minor" is a designation not in use for long after the time of Thucydides; but it is also true that the country so designated was, in his time, similarly distinguished from the rest of the Asiatic continent by a phrase of like value, that of ἡ κάτω Ἀσία, as distinct from ἡ ἄνω Ἀσία. That this distinction was familiar to Thucydides appears from I. 137. VIII. 5. of his work. I admit, however that, as he does not here use the Greek epithet, I was not entitled to use its English equivalent.

The same strength, with the same weakness, is observable in the objection (p. 82. note) to my description of Arrhibæus as a Thracian, rather than a Macedonian, potentate. Had my reviewer consulted any good geographical lexicon,—that of Smith, for example, the best in existence,—he would have found it stated (v. Thracia), partly on my authority, that the whole country immediately north of Thessaly bore, in the early Greek geography, the name of Thrace, and its inhabitants that of Thracian. The Macedonian tribes became exempt from this general designation with the spread of the Helleno-Macedonian kingdom. But many provinces afterwards comprised in that kingdom,—the Chalcidicë, for example, with its dependencies,—are still called Thrace by Thucydides. It seemed to me, therefore, a convenient distinction to restrict the term Macedonian to the subjects of the Hellenic dynasty. I admit however, that as the historian here pointedly calls Arrhibæus a Macedonian, I ought to have done the same.

These, I think, are the only two cases of actual error,—if such they can be called,—which the zealous exercise of my reviewer's analytical captiousness has succeeded in substantiating against me. The remainder of his note to p. 82. is a tissue of hypercritical subtleties not worth scrutinising in detail. It is not true that I have described Amphipolis as "lying south of Thasos." None but a caviller, bent at all hazards on putting me in the wrong, could ever, with due regard to the whole spirit of my description of that irregularly formed theatre of war, have distorted my meaning, here and in other instances, in such a manner.

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branch of the Attic legislature, happens to use the term Council, is not, I would humbly suggest, altogether what might have been expected from so zealous a champion of etymological exactness in translation as the National critic has everywhere else proclaimed himself. I venture to maintain that the English expression Assembly, though now sanctioned by inveterate usage, does not accurately represent the original term ἐκκλησία, by which that element of the Athenian constitution was designated; and, had it ever been my lot to write professedly on Athenian politics, I should have been much tempted to prefer the expression Great council, Popular council, or some other equivalent phrase, to denote the larger democratic body or Ecclesia, as distinct from the smaller aristocratic council, or Senate. The term ἐκκλησία is, in no respect, either in regard to its etymology or its sense, accurately translated by Assembly. By reference to its etymology, it implies a Select body. The Attic Ecclesia accordingly, though a large body, was a select one, consisting solely of male persons, qualified by right of citizenship and by age to exercise the democratic privilege. It was also a deliberative and a legislative body, and was therefore, I apprehend, in every proper sense a Council, though a large one. Any concourse of human beings, on the other hand, citizens slaves or foreigners, men women or children, drawn together for whatever purpose at Athens or elsewhere, would be an Assembly[1]; but it would not be an Ecclesia. For these reasons, while adopting generally, in the few instances where I have had occasion to refer to the Attic legislature, the commonly received but indefinite expression Assembly, to denote the Ecclesia as distinct from the Senate, it was the more natural that, under an involuntary impression of the true character and spirit of the former body, I should have been led in individual cases, when specially alluding to its deliberative and legislative acts, into the apparent inconsistency of characterising it more precisely as a Council. But on the ground already stated, I had least expected to be taxed with inaccurate thought by my present censor, even on account of

[1] Such as that to which Pericles addressed his Epitaphian oration, and which Thucydides himself designates (II. 34.) by a term equivalent to our Assembly, — that of ὅμιλος. The historian would never have thought of calling such a body of people an Ecclesia. The term Assembly, it may further be remarked, has never been used in any other than the wider sense in the pure idiom of the English tongue. The Scotch Church has its "General Assembly," as the first French revolution had its "Assemblée Nationale," &c. But no English legislative or deliberative body, — parliament, corporation, guild, court, or company, — has ever been styled an Assembly.

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an inconsistency, arising precisely from that minor kind of accurate thinking for which he is so great an advocate.

I am the less disposed to quarrel with the other alleged example of my want of accurate thought on Greek politics,—my having applied the terms Confederation and Federal to the political relation of the Greek states towards each other,—that it gives me an opportunity of offering a few remarks on a subject on which I have, whether accurately or otherwise, thought a good deal, though not to the same effect as my self-sufficient censor. The expressions condemned by him have at least been used advisedly, and after having been well considered. I have often been sensible, in my own case and that of other writers on Greek antiquity, of the want of some appropriate general term, to characterise that more comprehensive principle of national polity, by which, as well in their external relations to the "Barbarians," as in their internal relations to each other, the Greek states, through all their territorial, political, and social vicissitudes, all their individual dissensions, quarrels, and wars, were animated and united, from the earliest dawn of their mythical history, to the final absorption of their purely Hellenic character in the Macedonian ascendancy. Such phrases as Greek nation, Greek body of states, Greek body politic, and others to which writers commonly have recourse when in want of such a definition, are plainly inadequate. "Greek nation" expresses nothing more than community of race; leaving out of view both the separate States into which the nation was divided, and the mode in which they were connected. "Body of states" merely implies the fact that they were connected in some mode or other, but no way defines the nature of the connexion. "Body politic" implies a greater closeness of political union than that here in question. The term Confederacy appears to me the one, and the only one, which supplies the want, both as indicating the distinct elements of which the nation was composed, and the mode in which those elements were combined. I scarcely see how it can reasonably be denied, by reference to any received definition of the term, or to other cases in which it has been used by political writers, that the Greek republics were a Confederacy. A Confederacy may, I think, be defined generally, a body of States, under separate political governments, and with separate local interests, but animated by a certain community of national feeling as well as interest, for the more effectual maintenance of which they are led to provide by some common bond of public law or polity, distinct from the laws to which they are amenable in their separate capacity. Any such community of feeling I call a Federal feeling; the bond by which

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it is cemented a Federal bond; and the States who enter into that bond a Confederacy. If this definition be correct, it further appears that the Greek states during their whole flourishing period were a Confederacy. First, because during that period they were animated by a strong federal feeling; secondly, because they had given effect to that feeling by not only one, but several bonds of federal union. These were: I. the Amphictyonic council; II. the common national festivals, more especially that solemnised at Olympia. The first may be called the theoretical or constitutional bond, the others the practical or social bonds, of federal union.

The origin and object of the Amphictyonic Council, or common congress of the Hellenes, as it is styled in its own decrees, are described by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (IV. 25.) in terms not very dissimilar to those in which I have above defined a confederacy. Its mythical founder, he tells us, "seeing the race of Hellenes to be weak, and in danger of being overpowered by the surrounding Barbarians, assembled them at the congress, called after himself Amphictyonia; and enacted, in addition to the laws which each city possessed, others commonly called the Amphictyonic laws; through which they were enabled to uphold friendly relations among themselves, and become formidable to the foreign enemy." This council, of delegates from the several tribes or states, was in so far invested with a religious character, that its meetings were habitually held at Delphi, as the central seat of Hellenic worship, and that its proceedings, in ordinary times, were chiefly directed to the preservation of the rights of the Delphic god. But it also acted as a political court of appeal, in matters affecting the honour and interests of the Confederacy. It is upon this hieratic principle that all such councils seem to have been established among antient races of kindred or analogous character to the Greeks; among the Etruscans and the Latins, for example, to whose federal systems the sanctuaries of Voltumna and of Ferentina stood respectively in the same relation as that of Delphi to the Amphictyons.

While possessing, in theory, unlimited authority in their own legislative sphere, the Amphictyons, being provided with no executive machinery of their own, were dependent for any practical enforcement of that authority on the more powerful members of the Confederacy; who, while ready enough with their services when it suited their convenience, had no scruple, at other times, in following out their own views in defiance of all Amphictyonic restraints. Such has been in every age, and is to this day, the case with similar institutions. The Frankfort Diet, with all its diplomatic formalities and solemnities, is as

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much a machine in the hands of Austria and Prussia, as was the Imperial Diet in the hands of the ruling powers of the old German confederacy during the Thirty years', or Seven years' wars; or as the Amphictyonia of Delphi was in the hands of Sparta, Thebes, or Athens, during the Peloponnesian or Sparto-Theban wars, or in the hands of Philip of Macedon in the ensuing generation. The same remark applies to the Tarchuns and Porsenas of the Etruscan; and to the dominant States, the Alba, or the Rome, of the Latin confederacy. In all these cases the usurpation of individual rights in spite of federal forms, has been found compatible with the maintenance of that more comprehensive national feeling, and, where necessary, common action, which it was the object of those forms to promote. It is therefore a fallacy to reason, that because the Amphictyonic legislature was weak in itself, the federal feeling which it represented was also weak. That feeling was neither created by, nor dependent for its existence on the Amphictyonic Council. The council originated in, and depended for its existence on the feeling. It might hence more truly be argued that, had the federal principle which the council represented not been strong, the Greeks would not have been at pains, during so many centuries, to uphold the mere outward symbol of a thing which had no substantial existence. The council may commonly have been, as it was designated by Demosthenes, a shadow. But every shadow must represent a substance; and that the Amphictyonic shadow formed no exception to the general rule, is attested by other passages of the orator's works.

The right of the Amphictyons to interpose in cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction seems never to have been questioned; and instances of their effective interposition, where a majority of the federal interest were agreed, are recorded from time to time at every period of history. Tacitus, an author not accustomed to speak at random, describes them (Ann. IV. 14.), at the epoch of the Ionian colonisation, as the supreme court of judgement in national questions. During the Persian war they decreed punishments against traitors to the national cause; and Herodotus (VII. 213, 214.) notices their zeal and ability in the investigation of such cases. They also erected monuments in honour of the slain patriots[1]; and when Pausanias ostentatiously engraved his own name alone on the tripod dedicated at Delphi to commemorate the victory of Platæa, the Amphictyons, at the instance of the Platæans, compelled Sparta, under heavy penalties, to erase the inscription, and substitute

[1] Herodot. VII. 228., VIII. 8., conf. Paus. X. 19.

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one rendering equal justice to the other confederate warriors. To this interference on the part of Platæa was attributed, by some authorities[1], the vindictive feeling of Sparta towards that heroic little republic, which led to its cruel destruction in the Peloponnesian war. When, at the close of the Persian contest, the same Spartans suggested that the States which had sided with the Persians should be deprived of their Amphictyonic franchise, Themistocles, if we may trust Plutarch[2], opposed the measure, on the ground that its effect would be to secure to Sparta an undue share of influence in the Federal council. His opposition was successful, and gave so great offence to Lacedæmon, that, as in the parallel case of Platæa, she henceforth became his enemy, and did her best to damage his popularity with his countrymen, and promote that of his rival Cimon. Shortly afterwards, we learn from the same authority, the Amphictyons issued a decree for the expulsion of the Dolopians from the isle of Scyros, on account of acts of piracy committed against Hellenic voyagers, which decree was executed by Cimon. When the Thebans, after defeating the Spartans at Leuctra, erected a permanent trophy of solid material, instead of the temporary symbol of triumph alone sanctioned in the wars between Hellenic states, the Spartans indicted them for a breach of federal law before the Amphictyons, described by Cicero (De Inv. II. 23.), who records the anecdote, as the "Supreme Council of Greece." About the same time, under Theban influence, they awarded heavy penalties against Sparta, for her former treacherous occupation of the Cadmea, as a violation of that public faith which it was their office to uphold.[3] The other more remarkable instances of their official activity relate chiefly to the religious affairs of the Confederacy; the sacred wars, in support of the honour and privileges of the Delphic sanctuary, having been carried on in the name, or by authority, of the Amphictyons.

The Hellenic games were a development of the federal principle peculiar to Greece, and, especially as exemplified in the festival of Olympia, the most practical perhaps, and positive development of that principle, of which record is extant in antient or modern times. Other federal institutions were instrumental in promoting order and social harmony among confederates in the ordinary state of their commonwealth. The object of the Olympic bond of union was to keep alive the national feeling of the whole body, even in times when its

[1] Demosth. contr. Neær. p. 1377.
[2] In Themist. 20.; conf. Cim. 8.
[3] Diod. XVI. 23.; Just. VIII. 1.

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separate members were waging fierce war against each other. By the Ekechiria, or Sacred Armistice, as the fundamental charter of the institution was called, it was provided that, during the festival, hostilities between belligerent States should be suspended, or at least that the Elean territory should be neutral ground, where all Greeks might assemble and participate with equal freedom and safety in the celebration of the games. So that the same men who, before the commencement and after the expiry of the armistice, were bent on each other's destruction, were, during its existence, engaged in the common duty of renovating old associations of common national glory. Although the historical testimonies regarding a like Sacred truce during the other three national festivals, the Pythia, Isthmia, and Nemea, are less distinct, there can be no doubt that the principle was recognised, and at times as rigidly enforced, in respect to them also. These festivals were held at intervals, the Olympia of four, the others of three or two years; so that, on an average, such friendly meetings of belligerent Hellenes might occur once a year.

Thucydides supplies indirect evidence of the extent to which these sacred obligations were observed even during the heat of the Peloponnesian war. In III. 8. he mentions a Rhodian as Eponyme victor in the eighty-eighth olympiad, which date corresponds with the fourth year of the contest. Rhodes was a leading member of the Athenian alliance. If her citizens were admitted, not only to the scene, but to the highest honour[1] of the solemnity, it cannot be supposed that the other members of the alliance were excluded. We also learn from the historian, in a passage (VIII. 9, 10.) of great interest as affecting the whole question of Sacred armistice, that at one of the

[1] It must here be remembered, that the office of an Olympic combatant, or the glory of an Olympic victor, was not peculiar to himself. Whatever honour he might individually achieve, the public honour was that of the State to which he belonged, as the representative of which he was alone entitled to appear, and which was responsible for him as its champion in case of any irregularity in his mode of fulfilling his functions. No combatant could enter the arena, still less be proclaimed victor, in the name of a State excluded by the Hellanodicæ from participation in the solemnity. A native athlete however, of any one State of the confederacy, might appear as representative of another; in which case he required to drop his own citizenship and assume that of his patron city. Of this contingency Thucydides (v. 50.) also supplies an example. The chariot of the Spartan Lichas conquered in Ol. 90, under Bœotian auspices, his native city Lacedæmon being then, under the ban of the Hellanodicæ, disqualified for competing. The Bœotian community was proclaimed victor accordingly; and on Lichas coming forward and asserting the honour to himself, he was chastised by the guardians of the hippodrome for his presumption.

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most critical stages of the twentieth year of the war, the Athenians took part, under sanction of the local Ekechiria, in the Isthmian games, celebrated in the territory, and under the presidency of Corinth, the bitterest enemy of Athens. It further appears from the historian's account, that the Corinthians on this occasion were strongly pressed by their unprincipled Spartan allies to violate their law of sacred truce, on the plea that its observance would interfere with an important expedition which the two States were then planning in concert. The Corinthians however were staunch to their federal obligation, hostilities were suspended, and the result was, in fact, that the Athenians, at or during the festival, obtained such intelligence as, in the sequel, enabled them to defeat the hostile enterprise. I cannot understand how such customs could have subsisted during so many centuries in any body of States, among whom the federal principle was not fully recognised and ratified.[1]

Such were my reasons for characterising the bond of national union among the Greek states as a Federal bond, and the states themselves as a Confederacy. As the "thoroughly accurate thinker," who has rebuked me for so doing, has not condescended to explain his reasons on the other side, I am deprived of the advantage of being convinced by them of my error. I have not however observed that, amid the general indistinctness of ideas which prevails on the subject, any eminent modern writer on questions of Greek polity (himself excepted), has actually denied that the Amphictyons were a federal council, or, in so far, that the States which they represented were a Confederacy: so that any singularity on my part consists merely in availing myself, as I have done, and shall do hereafter, of those expressions, as the most concise and appropriate mode of defining the essentially national, as distinct from the local or individual, polity and interests of the Greek republics. The expressions further appear to me much more appropriate in this wider sense, than in the narrower sense in which they have habitually been applied by modern writers to the occasional leagues or alliances of the same republics, during the Peloponnesian and other internal wars of the Confederacy (I must be permitted so to express myself, for I can find no other

[1] If Corinth, under such circumstances, upheld her local law of armistice so steadfastly in favour of her hated enemies the Athenians, it is not likely that Elis, with so little interest in the quarrel, with so much every way in maintaining the brilliancy and popularity of her festival, and in her heart not friendly to Sparta, should have been willing, or able, from deference to that State, to exclude, during the entire Peloponnesian war, as some commentators have supposed, the same Athenians from the Olympic arena, in violation of the standard law of the whole confederacy.

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suitable word); alliances not ratified by even a shadow of permanent constitutional bond, to which the term federal can in a political sense reasonably attach; but called into existence by mere temporary expediency, and hence of mere temporary duration. Of the "Peloponnesian," or "Spartan confederacy," for example, as the league against Athens, in the wars described by Thucydides, has been habitually styled by modern authors, the principal members besides Sparta herself were Thebes and Corinth. In the immediately subsequent war we find these two States both leagued with Athens against Sparta. How temporary alliances, so composed and constituted, can be better entitled to be called Confederacies than the permanent Amphictyonic bond of national union, lax as it may have been, I am unable to perceive.

I have limited the foregoing remarks to those portions of the National reviewer's article which I have above described as exceptional, and as having hence induced me to swerve from my general rule of not replying to reviews. I allude to those parts of it in which he has endeavoured to prove my want of rudimentary qualifications for treating Greek literary history, by illustrations drawn from his own stores of that sound learning and accurate judgement in which he has found me deficient. It formed no part of my original intention to submit his other more general commentaries on my labours to the same analytical test. There is, however, one portion of them so curiously characteristic of the combined shallowness and sophistry of his method of criticism, and so injuriously unfair towards myself, that I have been induced to make a still further exception in its favour.

Two eminent writers of the present generation, Droysen, the German translator of Aristophanes (pt. ii. p. 282—306.), and our own English historian Grote, have published detailed vindications of the Athenian demagogue Cleon. Droysen, while the originator and most elaborate expositor of the common theory, and not inferior generally in learning and ingenuity to his English successor in the same field of argument, has the comparative demerit, in my estimation, of taking a still more favourable view than Grote of the character and conduct of Cleon, and a still harsher view of the spirit in which that character and conduct have been judged by Thucydides. In my own remarks on the subject (pp. 43. sqq., 146. sqq.) I had before me the previous speculations of each writer, and have referred to both in a foot-note. I did not consider it more necessary here than in other similar cases, to specify in detail the precise mode or extent in which I may have differed from,

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or even agreed, — as I have done on some points, — with either the one or the other. No reasonable person however could suppose that the opinions of two such authors, writing independently (for Grote nowhere betrays a knowledge of Droysen's previous researches), even in support of a common doctrine, would be altogether identical. It was therefore to be expected that any candid reviewer, with my citation of each before his eyes, would, in justice to them as well as to me, have borne in mind that my observations might have reference not to one alone but to both. The National reviewer's critical code recognises no such obligation. Whether from his usual flippant indifference to truth and fair play, from ignorance of German, or from what other cause he himself best knows, he ignores the existence of the German critic altogether! He everywhere assumes Mr. Grote to be both the originator and sole expositor of the Philo-Cleonian theory, as one unknown to "every previous writer;" the theory having, in fact, been fully developed and most elaborately discussed some fifteen years before Mr. Grote took it up. He interprets all my remarks or arguments on the general question mooted by the two authors, as directed with puerile captiousness against one alone; and labours, in page after page of rambling verbosity, to make out my perfectly candid and impartial treatment of the whole subject to be a tissue of casuistical prevarications and misrepresentations, as foreign to my purpose as to my nature; and which none but a reviewer, whose own method of criticism was so largely made up of such expedients, could ever have discovered either in the letter or the spirit of my language.

With reference to the chief of my alleged misrepresentations, I must here be permitted, in conclusion, distinctly to deny the National critic's statement (p. 82.): that "Mr. Grote fully accepts the narrative of Thucydides as to the scene in the Athenian Assembly;" meaning, I presume, that he fully admits its accuracy. The statement is a palpable untruth; as whoever compares Mr. Grote's text with the text of Thucydides will at once perceive. The two accounts resemble each other about as "fully," as in any case Harmony can resemble Discord. I look in vain to Thucydides for "the hostile murmur from a portion of the Assembly;" for the "two feelings both perfectly serious which divided the Assembly;" for the "scornful cheer repaid by cheers of encouragement;" for the "cheer and counter-cheer of an animated multitude, divided in feeling."[1] Of all this, which I find in Grote, I find the reverse

[1] Vol. vi. pp. 455. 460. 461. The graver, and certainly (as I have remarked, p. 146.) least justifiable charges brought against Thucydides by

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in Thucydides. Far from any allusion to divided feeling, the Greek historian represents the feeling of the "animated multitude" regarding Cleon's conduct on the occasion, as one of remarkable unanimity.

I have nowhere, in my former remarks on this subject, attached, nor is it my object now to attach, the slightest blame to Mr. Grote, for any construction he may have seen fit to put on this, or any other portion of the Attic historian's narrative which relates to the affairs of Cleon. The utmost I have done is to intimate in plain, but not offensive terms, the extent to which, with the grounds on which, I may have differed from him. I adhere to my reasons formerly given for disbelieving that, if the scene in the Athenian Assembly was such as Mr. Grote has described it, Thucydides would have had so little regard for his own character and credit, as to have presented *his* description of it to a contemporary public. The National reviewer was quite entitled, if he thought fit, to condemn my opinion. He was quite entitled to prefer the authority of Mr. Grote, in this matter, to the authority of Thucydides. But he was not entitled, in his zeal for Mr. Grote's theory, to falsify Mr. Grote's statements; still less to found on that falsification, equally false and frivolous insinuations against me, of the same dishonesty of which he has here himself been convicted.

One cannot fail to admire the discriminating impartiality of this strenuous upholder of accurate citation, who is scandalised at my discovery of "occasions of this kind," in the much vexed passage of VI. 53., which without that expletive would be nonsense; but can himself readily discover, in support of a new charge of disingenuousness against me,—"the two feelings both perfectly serious;" "the scornful cheers and cheers of encouragement, of a divided multitude," &c. &c., — in passages, not only barren of allusion to any such state of things, but plainly describing, "*whether truly or falsely*," a state of things entirely different.

Droysen (p. 298.), of what he calls "bitter and unscrupulous" misrepresentation, apply chiefly to his treatment of the later military portion of Cleon's career. Mr. Grote "accepts," as the National critic observes (but with some qualification), the historian's account of the battle of Amphipolis.

THE END.

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
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